The rhetoric of closed borders: quotas, lax enforcement and illegal immigration by Facchini, Giovanni & Testa, Cecelia
research paper series
Political Economy of Globalisation Programme
Research Paper 2020/30
The rhetoric of closed borders:
Quotas, lax enforcement and illegal immigration
Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa
The rhetoric of closed borders:
quotas, lax enforcement and illegal immigration
Giovanni Facchini∗and Cecilia Testa†
November 16, 2020
Abstract
Governments do not always enforce their laws, even when they have the means of
doing so, and lax enforcement is common in the domain of immigration policy. To
explain this paradox we develop a political agency model where gains from migration
are unevenly distributed, and an elected government chooses both quotas and their
enforcement. We show that distributional concerns can have perverse effects on migra-
tion policy since a utilitarian government may set a quota to appease the electorate,
but then strategically under-invest in its enforcement. Under-investment is more likely,
the larger the preference gap between median and average voter, and the higher the
likelihood of a populist challenger gaining office. Our analysis also indicates that redis-
tributive taxation reducing the share of enforcement cost borne by the median voter
exacerbate the problem, whereas a compensatory tax rebate financed through a tax on
profits from migration alleviates the conflict of interest, thus reducing illegal immigra-
tion.
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“(...) our government turns a blind eye to the thousands of people who illegally cross our
borders. These scenarios exists because corporate America has convinced our leaders that
this is one of the best ways to remain competitive” Lou Dobbs1
“When people make allegations about those here illegally the Home Office must act. Cur-
rently only 6 in 100 reports of illegal immigrants result in an actual investigation and only
1.5 in 100 result in removal.’” the Rt. Hon. Keith Vaz (Chair of the House of Commons
Home Affair Select Committee)2
1 Introduction
Enforcement plays a fundamental role in the implementation of many policies that rely on
legally binding provisions, such as licensing, taxes, tariffs or quotas to regulate economic
activities. Yet, even countries with well developed institutional structures and legal appara-
tuses face enforcement problems. This is for example the case in the domain of immigration
policy: while the regulation of international labor flows features prominently in the political
agenda of most Western democracies, those very same countries seem unable to get to grips
with the large numbers of undocumented aliens they host.3
Limited policy tools are often blamed as a cause of weak enforcement, but existing evi-
dence indicates that politics can, in fact, play an important role. In the domain of migration
policy, an important historical episode, namely the abolition of the U.S. “Bracero Program”
in 1964, emblematically speaks to this point. Introduced in 1942 to address war time agricul-
tural labor shortages, the Bracero program was renewed throughout the fifties at the request
of the U.S. agricultural lobby. However, by the early sixties, public opinion had turned




3Recent estimates suggest that in 2017 about 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the
United States as undocumented aliens, representing approximately 3.2 percent of the total residents and
23 percent of the immigrant population (Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/us-
unauthorized-immigrant-population-2017/). Other major immigrant destinations also host large numbers of
undocumented foreigners (Dustmann and Frattini 2013).
4When President Kennedy extended it for the last time in 1961, he expressed his concerns, pointing out
that ‘Studies of the operation of the Mexican labor program have clearly established that it is adversely
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finally ended in 1964, the United States did not stop employing Mexican workers; it simply
shifted from a de jure policy of active labor recruitment to a de facto policy of passive labor
acceptance, combining modest legal immigration with massive undocumented entry” (Du-
rand, Massey, and Parrado 1999, page 519). In fact, as pointed out by Green (1969) “It is not
pure fantasy to conclude that the policy of the Justice Department on illegal entry is to do
just enough to avoid wholesale criticism, without arousing the serious anger of antiunion em-
ployers who favor an abundance of cheap labor (Green, 1969, pages 405, 406)”. The limited
enforcement of migration restrictions endured – with several sectors relying heavily upon the
employment of unauthorized migrants.5 Although patrolling the US–Mexico border presents
inherent challenges, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) itself has
consistently emphasized the structural under-funding of enforcement agencies.6 The para-
dox of lax enforcement of restrictive migration policies is not unique to the United States,
since similar concerns have been raised in other major destination of migrations flows.7 Why
do governments set restrictive migration policies but do not endow their agencies with the
resources necessary to enforce them?
To answer this question we develop a framework that, on the one hand, shows how limited
policy tools lead to the emergence of illegal immigration, and on the other, highlights that
distributional concerns play an important role in explaining how strategic weak enforcement
can exacerbate the phenomenon. The unequal distribution of gains from free factor mobility
is considered a key driver of the anti-globalization sentiment pervading Western democracies
(Margalit 2008, Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013). We capture this idea by assuming that
affecting the wages, working conditions and employment opportunities of our own agricultural workers, large
numbers of whom are unemployed or underemployed.’ Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: John F. Kennedy, 1961.
5Recent estimates by the Pew Research center (Passel and Cohn 2016) indicate that unauthorized migrants
remain a significant fraction of the US civilian workforce accounting for respectively 26 and 15 percent of
workers in farming occupations and construction jobs, where they outnumber lawful immigrant workers.
6In particular GAO has documented substantial under-funding of enforcement activities in the domain
of employment sanctions (GAO 2005) and investigation and deportation of illegal aliens (GAO 2011, GAO
2017).
7In the UK, a recent enquiry by the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee (House of Com-
mons, Home Affairs Committee 2012) has pointed out a concerning discrepancy between the government’s
objective of reducing immigration and the limited amount of resources devoted to the UK Border Agency.
More generally, serious questions have been raised on the political will to curb illegal alien employment in
Western European countries (Miller 1994) as well as on the lack of resources to control unauthorized entry
via the asylum channel (Casarico et al. 2016, Hatton 2011).
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voters differ in their factor endowments, and capital-rich individuals prefer more foreign
workers. Thus, under standard income distributions (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Dutt and
Mitra 2002), the median prefers less migrants than the average voter.
To shed light on how distributional concerns interact with the limited set of policy tool
available to policy makers, we propose a simple two–period political agency model. In
this framework, the politician in office sets an official migration quota (number of visas) –
prescribing how many migrants can be admitted legally – and the resources to be allocated
to policy enforcement. Individuals in the country in excess of the quota are considered
undocumented (i.e. “illegal”) migrants. As it is typical in this class of models, we assume
uncertainty on the state of the world – in our case the supply of migrants – and asymmetric
information about the politician’s preferences. In particular, the public does not know
whether the incumbent is populist – i.e. his preferences are perfectly aligned with those of
the median voter – or utilitarian – i.e. he shares the preferences of the average citizen –
but knows the underlying type distribution.8 Between periods there is an election, in which
voters decide whether to re–appoint the incumbent or to replace him with another official
randomly drawn from the distribution of politicians types.
Uncertainty on the supply of migrants captures the idea that the government has limited
tools to enforce its quota: when the supply of migrants is larger than expected, the amount
of enforcement carried out is insufficient and illegal immigration occurs. Importantly, the
combination of uncertainty on the supply of migrants and asymmetric information on the
preferences of the politician implies that the public cannot perfectly infer the politician’s type
and thus the cause of illegal immigration, e.g. limited policy tools versus lax enforcement.
In this environment, rational voters use outcome measures of performance – i.e. the total
number of migrants in the country – to gauge the incumbent’s type. Since incumbents
want to be re-elected to influence future policy, electoral incentives will be powerful. We
show under what conditions a simple “reputation-building” equilibrium emerges. In this
equilibrium a utilitarian incumbent overrides his personal preferences to gain the support
of the median voter. To that end, he chooses the quota (number of visas) responding to
8While it has been documented that large majorities are often restrictionist, elected officials do not
always share these preferences (Facchini and Mayda 2008, Margalit 2008), leading to the emergence of a
public opinion gap (Chiswick and Hatton 2003).
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the median voter’s preferences, but underinvests in migration policy enforcement to de facto
admit more foreign workers as illegals.
Our model identifies two sources of illegal immigration. On the one hand, the govern-
ment might be unable to enforce its quota because the supply of immigrants is larger than
expected.9 This captures the idea that decision makers might have limited tools at their
disposal, i.e. they might not able to enforce the policy, even if they wished to do so. When
this happens, illegal immigration is higher, the more restrictive is the quota. On the other,
the incumbent might strategically under-invest in enforcement because of re-election con-
cerns. The prevalence of illegal immigration depends then on the interplay between the
incumbent’s type, the heterogeneity of preferences among citizens and populist pressures in
the destination country. The heterogeneity of preferences channel is at work when either
type of politician is in office. More specifically, if the preference gap between the median
and average voter increases, a populist incumbent sets a more restrictive quota, leading to
more illegal immigrants. A larger preference gap between the median and the average voter
also affects the behavior of a utilitarian incumbent, but through a different mechanism. As
the median voter becomes poorer, a “reputation-building” equilibrium, in which the utili-
tarian government sets the same quota as the populist, but under–invests in enforcement, is
more likely to emerge. As a result, an increase in inequality has two consequences. First,
the setting of a more restrictive quota leads to more undocumented immigrants. Second,
under-investment in enforcement increases their number even further. Concerning the role
of populist pressures – i.e. the likelihood that an incumbent will be replaced by a populist
politician at the end of the first period – our model points out that this channel affects
only the behavior of a utilitarian incumbent, making him more likely to engage in strategic
under–investment the larger is the threat of a populist gaining power in case of electoral de-
feat. Thus an important implication of our analysis is that political competition alone may
induce the utilitarian incumbent to distort policy, raising the number of illegal immigrants
above the social optimum.
While migration policy enforcement budgets are typically limited, the funding of border
9Note that in our model, in the absence of uncertainty illegal immigration will not occur. This is because
the quota is optimally set by trading off the benefits from migration and its costs, including those related to
policy enforcement.
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and domestic enforcement activities is often controversial.10 To shed some light on how
the mode of enforcement funding might affect illegal immigration, we extend our analysis
by modeling two alternative redistributive tax regimes. In the first system, the burden
of the enforcement varies directly across individuals; in the second one, the direct cost of
funding migration policy enforcement continues to be financed with a lump sum tax, but the
government levies also a proportional tax on the factor that directly benefits from migration,
namely capital. We show that the implications for migration policy vary significantly. Under
the first system, when the median voter pays a smaller than average share of the enforcement
cost, the preferences gap between median and average voter increases, leading to more illegal
immigration than in the benchmark case. Under the second scheme, where individuals
equally share the cost of enforcement, but the median voter is compensated through a tax
rebate financed by a tax on profits, the conflict of interests between capital-poor and capital-
rich individuals is alleviated, leading in equilibrium to lower levels of illegal immigration.
Our analysis has stark implications for Western democracies, which have witnessed in
recent years both an increase in anti-immigration sentiment and a raise in populist pressures.
When the majority of voters demands more restrictive migration policies or populist stances
are more likely to prevail, governments who are responsive to opposing interests will be more
prone to inefficient pandering. On the one hand, they will put in place tighter migration quo-
tas; on the other they will not equip their enforcement agencies with the resources necessary
to implement them. As a result, illegal immigration becomes more widespread.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the economic environment. Section 4 presents the political
game and the main results. In sections 5 and 6 we carry out a series of comparative statics
exercises. Section 7 concludes.
10See for example the recent debate around the realization of a wall along the US-Mexico border to be
paid – as promised by President Trump – by Mexico.
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2 Related Literature
The economic literature on enforcement of laws and regulations emphasizes the key role of
state capacity in regulatory and taxation policies (Besley and Persson 2009). The premise of
the ‘capacity’ approach is that governments attempt to enforce laws, but they may fail either
because of limited resources or because they rely on agencies (bureaucrats, local governments
etc.) with misaligned objectives (Mukherjee and Png 1995, Banerjee 1997, Burgess et al.
2012, Pagano and Immordino 2010 and Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
Alongside this economic literature, focussing on agency problems arising from the dele-
gation of enforcement powers, several scholars in the political science literature emphasize
instead the importance of the central government as a direct enforcer of laws.11 When
governments have the power to control subordinate agencies, weak enforcement might not
necessarily stem from limited state capacity. In fact, empirical evidence shows that, because
of electoral concerns, governments often fail to enforce laws, even when they have resources
and means for sanctioning violators (Holland 2016). Standard economic models cannot pro-
vide a rationale for lax enforcement when a central government has the capacity to directly
enforce laws. Our work fills this gap by proposing a novel set up in which an elected govern-
ment controls both the setting of a legal standard and its enforcement in a political agency
framework, where the role of voters’ preferences and re-election incentives can be explicitly
analyzed.12 By doing so we show that control on both the quota and its implementation
gives raise to a particular type of pandering, whereby the government sets a quota to appeal
to the majority of the electorate, while strategically under-investing in its enforcement to
obtain a different policy outcome closer to its own preferences.
The political economy forces in our theoretical framework are unleashed by the distri-
butional effects of immigration. A large literature in labor economics has investigated the
effects of immigration on native labor market outcomes reaching often contrasting results.13
11According to the so–called “congressional dominance” approach (Weingast and Moran 1983), elected
representatives have several tools at their disposal to control subordinate agencies, one of the most important
being the “power of the purse”, i.e. the allocation of the budget (Calvert, Moran, and Weingast 1989) For
a recent review of this literature, see Moe (2013).
12For an overview of political agency models, see Besley (2006).
13See for example Dustmann, Schoenberg, and Stuhler (2016) for a recent survey showing how differences
in the methodologies deployed can explain some of the differences in the estimated effects. See also Peri
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While the debate will surely continue, a few recent papers have highlighted that the variety of
results obtained in the literature might be reconciled by distinguishing between the “short”
and the “long run”. For example, Llull (2018) shows that when natives are not allowed to
adjust their human capital and labor supply decisions – i.e. in the short run – immigration
impacts natives’ labor market outcomes, with less educated, younger male individuals being
the most negatively affected. At the same time, when natives are allowed to change their
labor supply decisions – i.e. in the medium to long run – these effects are substantially mit-
igated. Similar findings have been uncovered also by Monras (2019), who estimates a large
negative short run impact of unskilled Mexican immigrants on similar native workers in the
U.S. in the aftermath of the 1995 Peso crisis, with only very limited effects instead observed
in the long run. Similar patterns have been uncovered also for refugee inflows by Borjas
and Monras (2017), with negative effects on the outcomes of competing domestic workers,
and positive effects for complementary workers. All this evidence provide support for our
assumption that immigration affects - at least in the short run, the time frame considered
in our settings - the income distribution in the host country.
The distributional impact of foreign workers on the political economy of migration policy
has been analyzed by several papers that have developed models explaining how voters or
lobbies influence policies towards overall migration (Benhabib 1996, Facchini and Willmann
2005 and Epstein and Nitzan 2006). Yet, the role of income inequality in determining
national policies toward labor movements in receiving countries remains notably absent from
this debate. Our works fill this gap by showing how inequality affects immigration quotas
and their enforcement.
Our works also relates to several papers focussing on optimal policies to limit the inflow of
undocumented foreigners (Ethier 1986, Bond and Chen 1987, Woodland and Yoshida 2006).
These papers provide rich frameworks in which both the decision to migrate and the effects of
different policies in the destination countries are considered. At the same time, they do not
explicitly analyze the role of political economy forces in shaping the demand side of illegal
immigration. Other papers have developed political economy models of illegal immigration
from the point of view of the host country. In an early contribution, Djajic (1987) looks
(2014) for a review of the cross–country evidence.
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at the level of enforcement that will be chosen by a government as the result of lobbying
expenditure. Similarly, Chau (2003) uses a model with lobbying to study the political process
through which border and domestic enforcement are chosen in equilibrium, and under which
conditions an amnesty might be introduced. Importantly, in both these frameworks, legal
immigration is absent from the model and as a result, the only source of additional labor
supply for the destination country is represented by undocumented foreign workers.14 In our
paper, instead, illegal immigration only takes place when the number of migrants entering is
higher than a binding official quota, and the phenomenon arises endogenously as the result of
the migration policy chosen by the government, i.e. the combination of quotas and resources
allocated to their enforcement.
3 Economic Environment
Consider a small open economy producing a single good using labor E according to a pro-
duction function Y = F (E), with F ′(E) > 0, F ′′(E) < 0. F (E) is such that there exists a
well-defined profit function associated to it, and the corresponding monetary payment can be
interpreted as the compensation received by an immobile factor.15 As for prices, we choose
aggregate output as the numéraire, the real wage in Home is denoted by w(E), and the profit
function is given by π[w(E)].
The economy is populated by a continuum of native individuals indexed by i ∈ [0, 1],
whose mass is normalized to one. Every individual i inelastically supplies one unit of labor
and receives a fraction λi > 0 of the profits π, with
∫
λidi = 1.
16 Furthermore, we assume
the domestic wage under autarky to be larger than the wage prevailing in the rest of the
world. Thus, abstracting from moving costs, foreign workers will always find it desirable
to relocate to Home. To capture the uncertainty in immigration pressure, the supply Î of
migrants is assumed to be stochastic, and depending on the state of the world s, which can
14For a model focussing on the sectoral dimension of illegal immigration see Hillmann and Weiss 1999.
15A natural candidate would be land, or alternatively capital.
16We assume the distribution of factor ownership to be atomless i.e., that every agent only owns a tiny




Kidi = K. Since population size is normalized to 1, K is also the average supply of the fixed factor
in the population. Define λi =
Ki
K > 0. Then E(λi) =
∫
I
λidi = 1. In other words, λi can be interpreted as
the holding of the fixed factor by agent i relative to the population average.
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be either low (L) or high (H) with probabilities 1 − q and q respectively. In particular, let
Î(L) = I < I = Î(H).
Admitting immigrants I leads to welfare gains for Home, which are bounded by the pres-
ence of a “congestion” cost c(I), which is a differentiable, increasing and convex function.17
Congestion costs capture for example, in a reduced form fashion, the presence of fiscal exter-
nalities associated with the scaling up of the provision of public services, and their presence
insures the existence of an interior solution for the optimal number of immigrants. The gov-
ernment can limit the migrant’s inflow by setting a quota – fixing for example the maximum
number of visas to be issued in a given year – whose enforcement is costly. In this stylized
model, the extent of resources necessary to enforce the quota is determined by a linear en-
forcement cost η[I, Î(s)] that depends on the supply of foreign workers Î(s) and the quota
I chosen by the government. To fix ideas, η could capture – for example – the resources
necessary to remove migrants who have entered the country in excess of the quota I or for
apprehending at the border immigrants that try to move to the country in violation of entry
requirements. Given the migrants’ supply, it is natural to assume that the more stringent is
the quota, the larger is the cost of enforcing it i.e. ∂η[I,Î(s)]
∂I
< 0. Moreover, a larger supply
of migrants has a positive effect on both the total and marginal cost of enforcement, i.e. if
I > I, η(I, I) > η(I, I) and | ∂η
∂I
(I, I) |>| ∂η
∂I
(I, I) | for all I. As a result, the supply of foreign
workers Î can affect the optimal migration policy. Finally, if the quota is not binding, i.e. if
I ≥ Î(s), then η[I, Î(s)] = 0.18 To keep the presentation simple, our analysis will focus on
situations in which the quota is always binding, i.e. I < I.
The utility of a native individual i, for a given state of the world s, can thus be written
as
ui[I, Î(s)] = λiπ[w(1 + I)] + w(1 + I)− c(I)− η[I, Î(s)] (1)
where 1 + I represents total employment of natives and migrants in the country.19 The
17To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that legal and illegal immigrants generate the same congestion
costs. One interesting extension of the model would involve allowing for asymmetries to capture for instance
the possibility that undocumented migrants might be more likely to be involved in criminal activities.
18An example of an enforcement cost function satisfying the above properties is given by ηs = as[Î(s)− I],
where aH > aL.
19In other words, native and immigrant labor are perfect substitutes in production. This assumption
simplifies the analysis of model, and allowing for imperfect substitutability, while complicating the algebra,
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first term on the right hand side captures the individual’s share of profits, the second his
wage income,20 whereas the third and fourth terms denote the congestion and the policy
enforcement costs, that are equally shared among all citizens.21 As long as the congestion
cost is sufficiently convex, the individual’s utility function in equation 1 is concave in I and
it is easy to show that:22
Lemma 1 The number of immigrants I∗(λi, s) maximizing individual i’s utility under the
state of the world s is an increasing function of λi. Moreover I






> η [I∗(λi, L), I].
Proof. See Appendix.
In the reminder of the paper we will simplify the notation and write I∗(λi, s) = I
∗
i (s).
Knowing the probability of each state of the world, i’s expected utility can be written as
E{ui[I, Î(s)]} = qui(I, I) + (1− q)ui(I, I) (2)
= Gi(I) + qη[I, I] + (1− q)η[I, I]
where Gi(I) = λiπ[w(1 + I)] + w(1 + I) − c(I) and qη[I, I] + (1 − q)η[I, I] is the expected
enforcement cost. To simplify the analysis, in the remainder of the paper we will assume a
linear labor demand and a quadratic congestion cost.23 Focusing on interior solutions, the
first order condition for expected utility maximization is given by
G′i(I) + qη
′[I, I] + (1− q)η′[I, I] = 0
would not significantly affect our conclusions.
20Note that in this model, since labor supply is inelastic and given by 1+I, the equilibrium wage, w(1+I)
is determined by w = F ′(1 + I), with w′(I) < 0 and profits are given by π[w(1 + I)] = F (1 + I)− (1 + I)w.
21In section 6 we will extend the analysis considering alternative redistributive taxation schemes to finance
the enforcement cost.
22Note that under this assumption we could accommodate also a non-linear enforcement cost, but this
would make the derivation of close form solutions to the utility maximization problem significantly more
involved.
23As discussed in Facchini and Testa (2009) a concave production function giving rise to a linear labor
demand is given by Y = (a/b)E − (1/2b)E2, with the labor demand E = a − bw, with a, b > 0. The
corresponding profit function is then given by π(w) = (a2/b)+(b/2)w2−aw. Using a more general production
structure (e.g. a constant elasticity factor demand) would make the analysis computationally more involved,
without changing the essence of our main results.
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Remember that η is linear in I and thus η′ does not depend on I and that G′(I) is monotonic.
As a result, I∗ = (G′i)
−1{−qη′[I, I]− (1− q)η′[I, I]} and since G′i is linear in I we have that
the migration quota I∗i maximizing expected utility is given by:
I∗i = (1− q)I∗i (L) + qI∗i (H) (3)
where I∗i (H) and I
∗
i (L) are respectively the optimal number of migrants under the high and
low state of the world. Furthermore, since the enforcement cost is linear in I, Lemma 1
implies that the amount of resources spent on the enforcement of the quota I∗i is given by:
24
η(I∗i ) ∈ (η[I∗i (L), I], η[I∗i (H), I]) (4)
Since the enforcement budget is chosen under imperfect information on the state of the
world, the migration quota cannot be exactly met. In particular, ex–post, given the realized
supply of foreign workers, the actual number of migrants Ii(s) is different from the state
contingent optimal quota I∗i (s).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
To understand this point, consider Figure 1, where we have represented the enforcement
cost functions under the two possible states of the world. If the state of the world is high, to
obtain the optimal immigration level I∗i (H), individual i should spend η[I
∗
i (H), I]. Hence,
having spent only
η(I∗i ) < η[I
∗
i (H), I] (5)
the actual number of migrants is Ii(H) > I
∗
i . At the same time, given the information
constraint, I∗i maximizes his expected utility. The difference Ii(H)−I∗i represents the number





> η [I∗i (L), I]). Since the expected enforcement cost function is a linear combination
of the enforcement costs functions under the two states of the world, with weights equal to the probabilities




and η [I∗i (L), I] provide upper and lower bounds to the amount of resources
spent on enforcement depending on the probabilities of the two states.
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of illegal immigrants. On the other hand, if the state of the world is low, the individual over-
invests in enforcement, and the number Ii(L) of immigrants actually entering the country is
lower than the quota, I∗i , i.e. no illegal immigration will arise in this case.
We can also show that:
Lemma 2 Ii(H)− I∗i decreases with λi.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 and 2 have some interesting implications. Consider two particular individuals, b
and p. The first is characterized by an ownership share λb equal to the country’s average (i.e.
λb = 1) and his preferences coincide in our setting with aggregate welfare.
25 The share λp
of the second equals instead the country’s median, and since preferences are single peaked,
the policy preferred by p will defeat any alternative under majority voting with pairwise
comparisons. Furthermore, we know that typical wealth distributions are such that λp < 1
(Alesina and Rodrik 1994). Thus, lemma 1 implies that social surplus maximization and
majority voting will deliver different outcomes: the median voter prefers a smaller number of
migrants (I∗p ) than the one maximizing social surplus (I
∗
b ), whereas his preferred enforcement
spending is higher (i.e. η(I∗p ) > η(I
∗
b )). Moreover, lemma 2 implies that illegal immigration
is higher if the policy preferred by the median instead of that preferred by the average voter
is implemented.
4 The migration policy game
We are now ready to describe the process that leads to the choice of the equilibrium migration
policy. We consider a model of elections with two periods, where the future is not discounted
and in each period the politician in office chooses a migration policy (e.g. a migration quota
and enforcement spending). Between periods there is an election, in which voters decide
whether to re–elect or not the incumbent, and in our single–dimension model the median




{λiπ(1 + I) + w(1 + I)− c(I)− η[I, Î(s)]}di = π(1 + I) + w(1 + I)− c(I)− η[I, Î(s)]
Since E(λi) = 1, aggregate welfare coincides with average welfare.
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voter plays a decisive role.26 Politicians may be one of two types denoted by g ∈ {p, b}. The
“populist” type (g = p), has preferences perfectly aligned with the median voter, whereas
the “utilitarian” (or Benthamite, g = b), has preferences aligned with the average voter. In
the context of our agency model, a natural way of justifying the presence of two types of
candidates could be to consider a “pre-election stage”, in which parties select candidates
among a pool of politicians with heterogeneous preferences, with utilitarian types appealing
to the interests of pro-business lobbies. To the extent that the general public is not perfectly
informed on the degree of influence of various interests groups this would generate uncertainty
on politicians’ types. The types of the first period incumbent and challenger are draws from
an identical distribution, and the probabilities that the politician is populist or utilitarian
are denoted by µ and 1− µ respectively.
4.1 Information and timing
As it is typical in political agency models, we assume uncertainty on the state of the world
– in our case the supply of migrants – and asymmetric information about the politician’s
preferences. Thus the supply of foreign workers Î(s) is not observed either by the politician
or the public, but they both know its distribution.27 The type of the politician is only
known to himself, whereas the distribution of types is common knowledge. Hence, in the
first period, the incumbent chooses a migration policy prescribing a quota and the amount
of resources to be spent on enforcement under imperfect information on the actual supply of
foreign workers. The quota is publicly announced – as it is often the case when it comes to
the number of visas that can be issued in a given year. The public is instead not perfectly
informed about the resources allocated to the enforcement of migration policy – a realistic
26Several studies have shown that migration consistently ranks among the most important issues in public
opinion surveys, both in Europe and in the United States. For example, Hatton (2020) points out that in 2016,
32% of the respondents in the 17 countries sampled by the Eurobarometer survey considered immigration
one of the two most important issues faced by the country. Similar patterns have been uncovered for the
United States (Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2017). Thus our single dimension model captures in a simple
way the salience of the migration issue.
27This is simplest way to incorporate uncertainty in our set-up to capture the fact that the politician
cannot perfectly control immigration flows. In real world, there are different possible sources of uncertainty,
such as for example the entry channel of migrants, the type of enforcement activities that is most effective
depending on the characteristics of the supply of migrants etc. As long as the politician has limited policy
tools and the public cannot perfectly infer the cause of illegal immigration, the main message of our analysis
will be the same.
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hypothesis given that even researchers have hardly been able to collect systematic data on
this issue.28
After the migration policy has been chosen, voters – having observed the quota I∗g and the
actual number of migrants Ig(s), but neither their true supply nor the amount of resources
spent on enforcement – revise their initial beliefs on the incumbent’s type according to
Bayes’ rule.29 We denote by µ[I∗g , Ig(s)] the posterior probability that the incumbent is
populist when the quota I∗g and the actual number of migrants Ig(s) are observed. Given the
posterior probability µ[I∗g , Ig(s)], voters choose whether to re–elect the incumbent or replace
him with a challenger. In the second period, the elected politician chooses again the number
of immigrants to be admitted under imperfect information on the supply of foreign workers.
All players realize their payoffs and the world ends.30
4.2 Equilibrium
The above structure defines a game of incomplete information between voters and politicians.
Using backward induction, we seek to characterize the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of
this game (PBNE), which consist of a migration policy, a voting rule and a set of beliefs
such that (a) the incumbent’s strategy is optimal given the voters’ beliefs and the oppo-
28To understand the nature of the problem, consider for example the recent U.S. experience. Two agencies –
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – are responsible
for the enforcement of migration policy as well as for a series of other duties - ranging from the prevention
of smuggling of contraband, to the prosecution and deportation of non–citizens who have been convicted of
a felony etc. The publicly available data refer only to aggregate budgets, making it impossible to precisely
measure the resources allocated to each particular activity. In fact these agencies have substantial flexibility
in the allocation of their resources and as pointed out by GAO (2005) “... After September 11, 2001, INS and
ICE focused their resources on national security-related investigations. According to ICE, the redirection
of resources from other enforcement programs to perform national security-related investigations resulted
in fewer resources for traditional program areas, like worksite enforcement and fraud.” The data from
Department of Homeland Security, on which GAO report are based, are not publicly available, and GAO is
exempted from the Freedom of Information Act.
29Our aim is to capture, in a stylized way, the fact that the public is aware of the existence of illegal
immigration, but it cannot see through all the details of the decision making process to understand whether
the government is putting in place all the necessary measures to tackle it. Estimates of the size of the illegal
immigrant population are often discussed in the press in many important destination countries – see for
example for the US the work by the Pew Research Center available at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/11/13/how-european-and-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-populations-compare/.
30Note that as argued in the literature (see Coate and Morris 1995), a two-period model is the simplest
finite horizon set-up in which the incentives provided by elections can be studied. It is of course possible to
consider a finite horizon model with several elections. In this case, applying backward induction, the main
thrust of our analysis would not be altered.
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nent’s and voters’ strategies; (b) the voting rule is optimal given the voters’ beliefs and the
politicians’ strategies; (c) voters update their prior beliefs according to Bayes’ rule when-
ever it applies, whereas implausible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are ruled out by equilibrium
dominance arguments (Cho and Kreps 1987).
In the last period, because there are no further elections, the incumbent simply chooses
the policy maximizing his second period expected pay-off, given the probability of each state
of the world. In the first period, the policy choice is more complex because of re-election
concerns, and it crucially depends on voters’ beliefs. To maximize his expected inter-temporal
utility, the incumbent needs to take into account that his policy choice affects not only the
expected number of migrants in the first period, but also his re-election chances, and thus
the second period policy. The latter in particular depends on whether the incumbent is
re-elected or not, and on the preferences of the challenger that might replace him. As a
result, when choosing the migration quota and the enforcement spending in the first period,
the incumbent must also take into account how voters will update their beliefs and cast their
ballot.
Remember that voters only observe the quota I∗g and the actual number of migrants Ig(s),
and use this information to compute the posterior probability µ[I∗g , Ig(s)] that the incumbent
is populist. Since the preferences of the utilitarian politician are not aligned with those of
the median voter, choosing the one period payoff maximizing strategy (i.e. playing sincere)
might turn out not to be inter–temporally optimal. In particular, for electoral purposes he
might gain from pooling with a populist by setting the quota I∗p and choosing an enforcement
level allowing him to replicate the number of migrants generated by the populist at least
under some state of the world. This is possible under three strategies.31 First, the amount
spent on enforcement coincides with η(I∗p ), so that the number of migrants admitted always
equals that chosen by a populist. We label this strategy “mimicking”. Second, enforcement
could be set at a level η(Iob ) > η(I
∗
p ) allowing to “pool” with the populist only if the state
of the world is high (i.e. Iob (H) = Ip(L)), whereas if it is low, the number of migrants will
be smaller than the lower-bound obtained by the populist, i.e. Iob (L) < Ip(L). Hence, the
31For simplicity, we illustrate the pooling strategies for the case of the utilitarian incumbent, that is the
most relevant for our analysis. The pooling strategies for the populist are analogously defined.
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expected number of migrants is Iob = qI
o
p(L) + (1 − q)Ip(L) where Iob < I∗p . We label this
strategy “over–investment”. Third, the enforcement expenditure could be set at a level
η(Iub ) < η(I
∗
p ) such that, if the state of the world is low, the migration level I
u
b (L) equals
that generated by a populist in the high state of the world, i.e. Iub (L) = Ip(H). Clearly, if
the state of the world is high, the number of foreign workers entering the country will be
larger than under the populist, i.e. Iub (H) > Ip(H). Thus, the expected number of migrants
is Iub = qIp(H) + (1 − q)Iub (H) with Iub > I∗p . We label this strategy “under–investment”.
Since this strategy will play a key role in our analysis, we have illustrated the corresponding
outcomes in Figure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Thus, once the quota I∗p is announced, the voter cannot rule out that the incumbent is
utilitarian. Voters can instead compute the posterior probability µ[I∗p , Ig(s)] that he is a
populist using Bayes rule whenever it applies, whereas we rely on equilibrium dominance
arguments (Cho and Kreps 1987) to eliminate implausible out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Intu-
itively, when a deviation from equilibrium is observed, the voter’s beliefs will assign zero
probability to the type of politician that cannot possibly gain by deviating. We are now
ready to establish a series of intermediate results needed to characterize the equilibrium of
the game. First, considering the behavior of the utilitarian incumbent, we can show that:
Lemma 3 In any PBNE that satisfies the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, a utilitarian in-
cumbent will never mimic the populist or over-invest.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand this result, note that the second period payoff from mimicking (over-
investment), in the best case scenario of re-election, is identical to the first period payoff
from playing sincere. At the same time, the second period expected payoff from playing
sincere, in the worse case scenario of no re-election, is higher than the first period payoff
from mimicking (over-investment). Thus, mimicking is strictly dominated by playing sincere,
and the same holds true for over-investment. Next, considering a populist politician, we can
prove that:
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Lemma 4 In any PBNE that satisfies the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion a populist incumbent




In other words, the populist will never find it optimal to perfectly ‘mimic’ the utilitarian.
To understand this result, note that the second period payoff from ‘mimicking’ the utilitarian
in the best case scenario of re-election is identical to the first period payoff from playing
sincere. On the other hand the second period expected payoff from playing sincere and not
being re-elected is higher than the first period payoff from ‘mimicking’, as with probability
µ the newly appointed politician will also be a populist.
From lemma 3 we know that the voter can rule out that the outcomes [I∗p , Ip(L)] and
[I∗p , I
o
b (L)] are generated by a utilitarian politician, and thus µ[I
∗




b (L)] = 1.
On the other hand, the outcome [I∗p , Ip(H)] may be generated either by a populist playing
sincere or by a utilitarian under-investing. Thus, by Bayes rule:
µ[I∗p , Ip(H)] =
µq
µq + (1− q)(1− µ)
where µq is the probability that Ip(H) is generated by a populist, and (1 − q)(1 − µ) is
the probability that it is generated by a utilitarian type under-investing in enforcement (if
the state of the world is low). Note that µ[I∗p , Ip(H)] ≥ µ if and only if q ≥ 12 . In other
words, under-investment can generate an upward revision of the ex-ante probability that the
incumbent is a populist only if ‘pooling’ is sufficiently costly for the utilitarian incumbent,
because the larger is q, the higher is the probability that by under-investing he will end up
revealing his type.
Given this structure of beliefs, a sequentially rational voting rule for the median voter is
to retain the incumbent if and only if the ex-post probability that the incumbent is a populist
is larger than the ex-ante, i.e. µ[I∗p , Ip(H)] ≥ µ.32 As a result, if q < 12 , under-investment
cannot be optimal for the utilitarian politician and µ[I∗p , Ip(H)] = 1. We are now ready to
characterize the equilibrium behavior of a populist politician.
32When µ[I∗p , Ip(H)] ≥ µ, then for the voter it is not optimal to replace the incumbent with a challenger
who is less likely to be populist, and the opposite is true when µ[I∗p , Ip(H)] < µ.
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Proposition 1 In any PBNE that satisfies the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion a populist in-
cumbent always plays sincere and is re-elected.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand this result, note that by playing sincere the populist generates the out-
comes [I∗p , Ip(s)], with s ∈ {L,H} and the voter finds it optimal to re–elect him because by
Bayesian updating µ[I∗p , Ip(L)] = 1 and µ[I
∗
p , Ip(H)] = 1 if q < 1/2 and µ[I
∗
p , Ip(H)] > µ if
q > 1/2. As a result, he finds it optimal to play sincere.33
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium behavior of a utilitarian incumbent. As
we have already pointed out, if in the first period he chooses the migration policy preferred
by the average voter (sincere strategy), he can only decrease his ex-post probability of being
considered a populist, whereas by ‘pooling’ with a populist, he may raise it. Given that the
populist politician always plays sincere, in order to ‘pool’, the utilitarian must (i) set the
median voter most preferred quota I∗p ; and (ii) choose a level of enforcement that allows him
to replicate the same number of migrants admitted by the populist under at least some state
of the world.34
We have already shown that mimicking the populist and over-investment are strictly
dominated by playing sincere (see lemma 3), and that if q < 1
2
, under-investment cannot
be optimal. At the same time, if q ≥ 1
2
, under-investment might be optimal because if the
state of the world is low, the incumbent is re-elected. Remembering that if the state of the
world is high, he will be replaced by a populist with probability µ and by a utilitarian with
probability (1 − µ), and denoting by E{ub[η(Ig)]} his expected one period payoff when the
amount spent on enforcement is η(Ig) and the expected number of migrants is Ig, then when
q ≥ 1
2
his expected intertemporal payoff from under-investment can be written as:
U(under) = E{ub[η(Iub )]}+ (1− q)E{ub[η(I∗b )]} (6)
+ qµE{ub[η(I∗p )]}+ q(1− µ)E{ub[η(I∗b )]}
33We also show that the populist cannot gain from deviating from the sincere equilibrium, hence by
equilibrium dominance arguments we can to rule out other equilibria supported by implausible out-of-
equilibrium beliefs (see proof in appendix).
34Note that (i) and (ii) imply that the utilitarian politician cannot pool by choosing [I∗p , η(I
∗
b )], i.e.
µ[I∗p , Ib(s)] = 0 for all Ib(s) ∈ {Ib(L), Ib(H)}.
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The first term on the right hand side of the equation denotes the expected first–period payoff
from playing the underinvestment strategy. The second, third and fourth terms denote
instead the second period payoffs when different states of the world materialize in the first
period. In particular, if the state of the world is low, the incumbent will be reappointed to
office and will implement his most preferred policy in the second period (the second term).
If the state of the world is high instead, then the incumbent will be replaced at the election,
with probability µ by a populist, and with probability (1− µ) by another utilitarian (third
and fourth term respectively). Both agents implement their most preferred policy once in
office, as they are not concerned with re–election.
Since the utilitarian politician will not be re-elected if he plays sincere, then his expected
intertemporal payoff under this strategy is given by:
U(sincere) = E{ub[η(I∗b )]}+ µE{ub[η(I∗p )]}+ (1− µ)E{ub[η(I∗b )]} (7)
We can now determine when underinvestment is preferred to playing sincere (e.g. U(under) >
U(sincere)). Let L1(λp) = E{ub[η(Iub )]}−E{ub[η(I∗b )]} < 0 be the first period expected util-
ity loss from choosing under–investment rather than the sincere strategy, and let G2(λp) =
E{ub[η(I∗b )]}−E{ub[η(I∗p )]} be the second period expected utility gain from being in power,
as compared to being replaced by a populist challenger. Under–investment is preferred if
the following holds:
L1(λp) + (1− q)µG2(λp) > 0 (8)
where the second term on the left hand side represents the expected second period gain from
under–investment. 35
Let µ̃u = − L1(λp)(1−q)G2(λp) , where 0 < µ̃u < 1, then the following holds:
Proposition 2 If q > 1
2
and µ > µ̃u, there exists a pooling equilibrium with under–investment
whereby, if s = L, the utilitarian incumbent admits Ip(H) migrants and is re-elected, whereas
if s = H, Iub (H) migrants are admitted and he is voted out of office. If q >
1
2
and µ < µ̃u,
35Note that if the state of the world is low – which happens with probability (1 − q) – the utilitarian
incumbent will be re-elected and obtain his most preferred level of migration in the second period. Since by
playing sincere he could obtain the same gain with the lower probability (1− q)(1− µ), the expected gain is
given by (1− q)µG2(λp).
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there exists instead a separating equilibrium such that Ib(L) migrants are admitted if s = L,
Ib(H) are admitted if s = H, and the utilitarian incumbent is never re-elected. Finally, if
q ≤ 1
2
the utilitarian incumbent plays sincere and is not re-elected.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first part of the proposition points out that electoral incentives can induce the
utilitarian politician to admit on purpose more migrants than the number specified under
his official quota, by strategically under-investing in enforcement. Moreover, re-election
concerns raise illegal immigration above the level implied only by imperfect information on
the true supply of foreign workers. In fact, if the utilitarian politician played sincere, illegal
immigration, which only arises when the state of the world is high, equals Ib(H) − I∗b . On
the other hand, with underinvestment, illegal immigration arises always, and under the high
state of the world, it is higher than that occurring if the politician plays the sincere strategy
(i.e. Iub (H)− I∗p > Ib(H)− I∗b ).
5 Preferences Heterogeneity and illegal immigration
Our model shows that re-election concerns can induce a utilitarian politician to ‘distort’
his migration policy.36 Since, as shown in proposition 2, heterogeneity of preferences is
crucial for this result, in this section we further explore the role played by i) the fixed
factor’s ownership distribution (income inequality) and ii) the likelihood that the politician
preferences are aligned with those of the median voter.37
To assess the role of income inequality, we study how the incentives to under–invest
highlighted in proposition 2 change with the share of the fixed factor owned by the median
voter. As λp decreases, the number of migrants admitted by a populist politician decreases.
As a result, the utilitarian politician has more to gain from remaining in office, implying
36In a different set up, focussing on the transmission of information from the government to its citizens,
Alboronoz, Esteban, and Vanin 2014 show how a benevolent government might distort information commu-
nication with the hope to increase social welfare.
37An additional comparative statics exercise could have involved a change in the enforcement cost across
countries. In our setting an increase in the policy enforcement cost unambiguously leads to an increase in
the number of legal immigrants to be admitted. At the same time, under our assumption on the form of the
utility function, this will not affect the incentives faced by the utilitarian politician. The formal argument is
available upon request.
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that (1 − q)µG2(λp) is a decreasing function of λp, which tends to zero as λp approaches
one. On the other hand, L1(λp) crucially depends on the difference between the amount of
resources spent on enforcement if the politician chooses to under–invest (η(Iub )) instead of
playing sincere (η(I∗b )). Clearly, if η(I
u
b ) = η(I
∗
b ), then the number of migrants admitted
with under-investment coincides with the one obtained with the sincere strategy, and the
expected loss equals zero. As we depart from this point (either by increasing or decreasing
η(Iub )), the expected loss will increase, because the further away is η(I
u
b ) from η(I
∗
b ), the
larger is the gap between the number of migrants entering the country in the two cases.
Remembering that η(Iub ) decreases with λp,
38 we can represent the two relationships on the
same diagram, with 0 < λp ≤ 1. Assuming that G2(λp) is flatter than L1(λp) as λp tends
to zero, if the largest possible gain is bigger than the corresponding loss – as illustrated in
Figure 3 – there exists a unique value λsup of the median voter’s capital share such that the
two curves intersect. As a result, we have that:
Proposition 3 Assume that limλp→0G2(λp) > limλp→0 L1(λp). Then an equilibrium with
under–investment arises for all λp < λsup, whereas a separating equilibrium arises if λp >
λsup.
Thus, if the median voter’s share of profits is sufficiently close to the average (i.e. λp >
λsup), then a utilitarian politician will not raise illegal immigration above the ‘constrained
efficient’ level by carrying out strategic under–investment. As a result, if λp > λsup the
number of migrants admitted legally will be higher and the number entering illegally will
be lower than if λp < λsup.
39 Hence, one interesting prediction of our model is that under–
investment with inefficiently high illegal immigration is more likely to occur the more unequal
is the distribution of rents accruing to fixed factors.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
38As λp increases, the populist’s migration quota increases and his enforcement spending decreases. Thus
the spending required for the under-investment strategy declines.
39Note that if instead limλp→0 G2(λp) < limλp→0 L1(λp), then there exists a λinf such that an equilibrium
with under–investment will arise if λinf < λp < λsup.
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Using Figure 3, we can also analyze the effect of a change in the likelihood that a politician
has preferences aligned with those of the median voter: as µ increases, the expected second
period gain from underinvestment (1− q)µG2(λp) shifts upwards, leaving the expected loss
function L1(λp) unaffected. This results in an increase in the range of λp values for which
an equilibrium with under–investment arises. Formally:
Proposition 4 For a given λp, an equilibrium with under–investment is more likely to arise
the larger is the ex-ante probability µ that the politician is populist.
This result highlights the importance of political competition as a driving force behind
policy choices. To illustrate this point, consider again Figure 3 and assume that λp > λsup
so that the utilitarian is not underinvesting. Suppose now that µ increases, implying that
the utilitarian politician’s gains from holding office in the second period raise (dotted curve),
with λ′sup pinning down the new intersection. If the increase in µ is sufficiently large so
that λsup < λp < λ
′
sup, then political competition really matters since now the utilitarian
politician will underinvest to prevent a populist from winning office, exacerbating the illegal
immigration problem.40 This result can shed light on how even just the emergence of populist
forces witnessed by many western destination countries can affect policy choices due to
strategic considerations in the electoral competition.
6 Taxation, redistribution and illegal immigration
We have so far assumed that the cost of enforcement is equally shared among the citizens
of the destination country. As a result, heterogeneity of preferences on the optimal number
of migrants is purely driven by the asymmetric distribution of the benefits from migration.
In reality, the provision of public goods (e.g. migration policy enforcement) in most modern
fiscal systems involves redistribution, and as a result richer individuals tend to contribute
more than their poorer counterparts.41 What are the effects of introducing a more realistic
40We would like to thank the editor for suggesting this interpretation.
41While obtaining data on spending on migration policy enforcement is challenging, the evidence we have
from GAO (2005) does indeed suggest that the overall amount of resources allocated are rather limited.
Still, the issue of how enforcement is financed and its implications on taxation has been quite controversial
in the recent political debate. For example, when President Trump announced the construction of a wall on
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fiscal system on the levels of illegal immigration emerging in the political equilibrium?
In this section we consider two possible alternatives. The first one directly allows the
burden of the enforcement to vary across individuals. The second retains instead a lump
sum tax to finance migration policy enforcement, but adds a proportional levy on capital,
i.e. on the factor that benefits from the inflow of immigrants. While both settings capture
the idea of redistributive taxation, as we will see their implications for migration policy vary
significantly.
The first scheme can be thought of as simplified characterization of the working of most
modern fiscal systems, where individuals contribute different amounts to the provision of a
public good (i.e. migration policy enforcement). Under this regime every individual i pays
a share γi of the enforcement cost so that his utility function becomes:
ui[I, Î(s)] = λiπ[w(1 + I)] + w(1 + I)− c(I)− γiη[I, Î(s)] (9)
Using the same argument of lemma 1, we can immediately establish the following result:
Lemma 5 The number of immigrants I∗i (s) maximizing individual i’s utility under the state
of the world s is an increasing function of γi. Moreover, illegal immigration becomes more
severe as γi decreases.
Focusing now on the share of enforcement cost borne by the median voter (γp) we can
focus on a redistributive scheme, whereby the median voter pays a smaller fraction of the
enforcement cost compared to the average voter, e.g. 0 < γp < 1. Our main result is
summarized in
Proposition 5 Suppose that 0 < γp < 1. An equilibrium with under-investment is more
likely to arise the smaller is γp.
Intuitively, the extent to which individuals internalize the cost of enforcement crucially
depends on how the cost is financed. As γp decreases – i.e. as the tax system becomes more
redistributive – the gap in the most preferred level of migration between the median and
the US-Mexico border, he emphasized that “Mexico will pay for it”. Later on the financing of the project
became highly controversial, leading even to a government shutdown at the end of 2018.
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the average voter increases. As a result, everything else equal, a utilitarian policy maker
will be more likely to resort to under–investment for electoral purposes. Therefore, for a
given distribution of capital, this type of scheme leads to more illegal immigration because
it exacerbates the conflict of interest between capital-rich and capital-poor individuals.
The alternative scheme we consider is instead aimed at reducing the distributional con-
flict in the native society and works as follows: the enforcement cost is equally shared among
all individuals through a lump sum tax T = η[I, Î(s)], but every native is eligible to receive
a proportional tax rebate tiπ[w(1 + I)], such that
∫
tiπ[w(1 + I)]di = 0.
42 This tax scheme
could be desirable since, on the one hand, it does not affect the extent to which individuals
internalize the cost of enforcement, on the other, it can be used to compensate individu-
als who contribute equally to the cost of enforcement while enjoying a lower return from
migration. Under this taxation scheme the utility of every individual i becomes:
ui[I, Î(s)] = λiπ[w(1 + I)] + w(1 + I)− c(I)− T + tiπ[w(1 + I)] (10)
Consider now a redistributive scheme whereby the median voter receives a positive tax rebate
tpπ[w(1 + I)] > 0. In this case it is immediate to establish the following:
Proposition 6 An equilibrium with under-investment is less likely to arise the larger is the
proportional tax rebated to the median voter.
Intuitively, the tax rebate changes the return to capital, alleviating the conflict of interest
between rich and poor individuals. As these simple examples show, the redistributive nature
of the fiscal system might play a role in exacerbating illegal immigration unless it tackles
directly the distributive conflict lying at the heart of our analysis.43
42In other words some individuals will be net receivers, whereas others will be net contributors.
43In our uni-dimensional setting we do not model political competition on taxation. In practice political
parties often run campaigns promising a tough stance on immigration, combined with fiscal restraint. Hence,
when it comes to the realization of their pledges, they might be unable to keep both promises, and thus
renege on their migration pledge by under-investing in order to keep taxes low. While a multidimensional
setup is beyond the scope of our analysis, this indicates yet another source of strategic behavior that could
lead to under-investment in migration policy enforcement.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a model in which illegal immigration arises endogenously
as the result of a binding official immigration quota and imperfect enforcement. Further-
more, we have shown that electoral concerns play a crucial role. In particular, as long as
the government has an information advantage over the public concerning the way it controls
migration flows, it might find it optimal to announce a quota pleasing a majority of the elec-
torate, but then strategically relax its enforcement. Thus, our model is able to explain both
the prevailing political rhetoric of “closed” borders and the systematic lack of enforcement.
While we have focused on the design and enforcement of migration policy, the analysis
carried out in this paper has implications for a broader variety of economic environments in
which elected officials both codify and enforce rules and regulations. Two contexts appear
particularly relevant: taxation and regulatory policy. We often see governments setting very
high headline tax rates, but then carry out limited efforts to enforce them. The result is
pervasive tax evasion, which often has first–order consequences on the distribution of the
actual tax burden. Similarly, when it comes to regulatory policy, it is not uncommon to
observe stringent anti–trust or environmental policy being legislated but not adequately
enforced. Our model thus provides useful insights on the incentives faced by elected officials
when simultaneously choosing policies and their enforcement.
We can think of at least two lines along which our theoretical model could be extended.
First, the process through which policy enforcement is captured in our paper is rather simple,
i.e. it is the choice of a single elected body. In reality, the implementation of legally binding
standards often involves multiple agents. An analysis of the micro–level interactions among
the various elected bodies playing a role in the enforcement process might provide further
insights to understand some of the existing enforcement policy puzzles. Second, enforcement
in one country can generate externalities on its neighbors’. An interesting extension of our
analysis would involve accounting for these spillovers, in an environment in which quotas
and enforcement are set strategically. An analysis of a richer model which considers these
aspects is left for future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The optimal number of migrants I∗(λi, s) is the solution of the
following first order condition
u′i[I, Î(s)] = −λi(1 + I)w′(1 + I) + w′(1 + I)− c′(I)− η′[I, Î(s)] = 0 (11)
where we have used Hotelling’s lemma ( dπ
dw
= −E) and the factor market clearing condition
E = 1 + I. Equation 11 defines a function g[I∗(λi, s), λi] ≡ u′i[I, Î(s)] = 0 and applying the










Given that the utility function in equation 1 is concave, ∂g
∂I
< 0. Notice that ∂g
∂λi
= −(1 +
I)w′(I) > 0, which implies the result. Moreover, since | ∂η
∂I
(I, I) |>| ∂η
∂I
(I, I) | for all I, for
the first order condition to be satisfied, I∗(λi, H) > I
∗(λi, L). Finally, if c(I) is sufficiently
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, remember that Ii(H) is the actual number of migrants entering when η(I
∗
i )





= η(I∗i ), and the linearity of the enforcement cost implies that:
η(I∗i ) = (1− q){(1− q)η[I∗i (L), I] + qη[I∗i (H), I]}+ q{(1− q)η[I∗i (L), I] + qη[I∗i (H), I]}
As the function η[Ii, I] is monotonic in Ii, then Ii(H) = η
−1 [η(I∗i ), I]. Some simple
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(I, I) | by assump-





, thus establishing the result.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that playing sincere dominates mimicking. Let
E{ub[η(Ig)]} denote the one period expected payoff when the amount spent on enforce-
ment is η(Ig) and the expected number of migrants is Ig, where E{ub[η(Ig)]} is a concave
function that is maximized when enforcement spending equals η(I∗b ) and I
∗
b = (1−q)I∗b (L)+
qI∗b (H). Thus E{ub[η(I∗b )]} denotes the one period expected payoff from playing sincere, and
E{ub[η(I∗p )]} denotes the one period expected payoff from mimicking.
In the best case scenario in which the utilitarian plays mimicking in the first period and
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is re-elected, his intertemporal expected payoff will be
E{ub[η(I∗p )]}+ E{ub[η(I∗b )]} (15)
On the other hand, if he plays sincere, in the worse case scenario of no re-election, he obtains
the following intertemporal expected payoff:
E{ub[η(I∗b )]}+ µE{ub[η(I∗p )]}+ (1− µ)E{ub[η(I∗b )]} (16)
Since by expected utility maximization E{ub[η(I∗p )]} < E{ub[η(I∗b )]}, it follows immediately
that (15) < (16). We now show that over-investment is strictly dominated by playing
sincere. Let E{ub[η(Iob )]} be the one period expected payoff from playing over-investment
where Iob = qI
o
p(L) + (1 − q)Ip(L) and Iob < I∗p < I∗b . In the best case scenario in which the
utilitarian plays over-investment and is re-elected, his intertemporal payoff is given by
E{ub[η(Iob )]}+ E{ub[η(I∗b )]}. (17)
On the other hand, if the utilitarian plays sincere, in the worse case scenario in which
he is not re-elected, he obtains the intertemporal expected payoff given by equation 16. To
establish that playing sincere strictly dominates over-investment we need to show that:
µE{ub[η(I∗p )]}+ (1− µ)E{ub[η(I∗b )]} > E{ub[η(Iob )]} (18)




b , by concavity of E{ub[η(Ig)]} and expected utility maximization,
E{ub[η(I∗b )]} > E{ub[η(I∗p )]} > E{ub[η(Iob )]}, which implies the result.
Proof of Lemma 4. We show that for the populist playing sincere strictly dominates
choosing the utilitarian’s most preferred policy [I∗b , η(I
∗
b )]. Let E{up[η(Ig)]} denote the one
period expected payoff when the amount spent on enforcement is η(Ig) and the expected
number of migrants is Ig, where E{up[η(Ig)]} is a concave function that is maximized when
enforcement spending equals η(I∗p ) and I
∗
p = (1 − q)I∗p (L) + qI∗p (H). Thus E{up[η(I∗p )]}
denotes the one period expected payoff from playing sincere and E{up[η(I∗b )]} denotes the
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one period expected payoff from choosing the utilitarian’s most preferred policy .
In the best case scenario in which the populist chooses η(I∗b ) and is re-elected, his in-
tertemporal expected payoff will be
E{up[η(I∗b )]}+ E{up[η(I∗p )]} (19)
On the other hand, if he chooses η(I∗p ), in the worse case scenario of no re-election, he obtains
an intertemporal expected payoff:
E{up[η(I∗p )]}+ µE{up[η(I∗p )]}+ (1− µ)E{up[η(I∗b )]} (20)
Since by expected utility maximization E{up[η(I∗p )]} > E{up[η(I∗b )]}, it follows immediately
that (19) < (20).
Proof of Proposition 1. In Lemma 4 we have already established that playing since
strictly dominates choosing the policy [I∗b , η(I
∗
b )]. We now show that in equilibrium the pop-
ulist always plays sincere and is re-elected. Remember that by playing sincere the populist
generates the outcome [I∗p , Ip(L)] when s = L and [I
∗
p , Ip(H)] when s = H. We have already
shown that Bayesian updating implies that µ[I∗p , Ip(L)] = 1, and that µ[I
∗
p , Ip(H)] = 1 if
q < 1/2 and µ[I∗p , Ip(H)] > µ if q > 1/2. As a result, voters find it optimal to re-elect an
incumbent generating the outcomes [I∗p , Ip(L)] and [I
∗
p , Ip(H)] and the populist incumbent
finds it optimal to play sincere, since this allows him to obtain the maximum expected payoff
in both periods.
Applying equilibrium dominance arguments, we now show that the populist incumbent
never finds it optimal to deviate from the sincere equilibrium by choosing a level of enforce-
ment η(Ig) ̸= η(I∗p ) or a quota Ig ̸= I∗p . To this end, consider first the expected payoff from
all possible deviations η(Ig) ̸= η(I∗p ) in the best case scenario, e.g. when the populist chooses
η(Ig) ̸= η(I∗p ) and is re-elected. In the second period he will receive the same payoff as by
playing sincere. However, since by expected utility maximization the first period payoff is
maximized when enforcement spending is equal to η(I∗p ), then η(I
∗
p ) is strictly preferred to
any other level of enforcement η(Ig) ̸= η(I∗p ).
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Next, consider the case where the populist chooses η(I∗p ) but sets a conflicting quota
Ig ̸= I∗p . First note that the quota can only affect the payoff of the incumbent if it affects
the voter’s decision to re-elect him. If the voter disregards the conflicting signal, then the
ex-post probability that the incumbent is considered populist will be the same as in the
sincere equilibrium and the populist will be re-elected. However, suppose that with some
probability the voter believes that the quota reveals some information on the preferences of
the politician. If the voter updates upward the ex-ante probability µ that the incumbent
is populist when Ig is observed, then he will re-elect the incumbent populist as he does in
the sincere equilibrium. On the other hand, if he updates downward the ex-ante probability
µ when the quota Ig is observed, then he will not re-elect the incumbent. As a result, if
the populist announces a quota Ig ̸= I∗p , with some probability he will not be re-elected.
Hence a populist incumbent cannot gain from setting a quota Ig ̸= I∗p because this can only
worsen his re-election prospects. From the above chain of arguments, a sophisticated voter
can exclude that any outcome different from [I∗p , Ip(L)] and [I
∗
p , Ip(H)] is generated by a
populist incumbent.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have already shown that under-investment cannot be optimal
when q ≤ 1
2
. On the other hand, when q > 1
2
, under–investment is optimal if and only
L1(λp) + (1− q)µG2(λ) > 0, that is if and only if µ > µ̃u = − L1(λp)(1−q)G2(λ) .
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Figure 3: Varying income inequality
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